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Introduction
There is a long history amongst some Protestant writers, which continues 
to the present day, of criticism of the early church fathers as being overly 
influenced by Platonism, and, therefore, by an insidious “paganism.” The 
scholar Wouter Hanegraaff has meticulously documented how this par-
ticular meme of the “Hellenization of Christianity” originated with certain 
Roman Catholic scholars who were reacting against the excesses of Renais-
sance thinkers like Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. It was then 
taken over with great enthusiasm by a whole series of seventeenth century 
Protestant historians (in particular, Jacob Thomasius and Ehregott Daniel 
Colberg), who found that it could be developed into an extremely effective 
apologetic weapon against Catholicism. However, this particular weapon 
turned out to be almost as dangerous for its Protestant handlers, as it did 
for its Catholic ones; it could very effectively be turned against orthodoxy 
in general, and the doctrine of the Trinity in particular. Thus, in the seven-
teenth century, Jacques Souverain developed an influential argument that 
“the Roman Catholic concept of the Trinity was in fact the product of ‘gross 
platonism’ introduced by the Fathers of the second and third centuries.”1
Whatever we are to make of this “Hellenization of Christianity” discourse 
(a matter to which it will be necessary to return later), it is important to keep 
in mind that, as the Sermon on the Mount famously notes, it is very easy to 
see the speck in the eye of someone else, whilst being blissfully unaware of 
 
 
1 The quotation is from Wouter Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge 
in Western Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 99–100. The rest of this 
paragraph is derived from the first two sections of Hanegraaff ’s superb study.
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the log in one’s own. In this case, that means reacting against the perceived 
faults of Christians of earlier times in having being negatively influenced by 
their particular surrounding culture, while at the same time utterly failing 
to have insight into the detrimental influence that modernity and contem-
porary Western culture might have had on our own theological constructs. 
This is the question that will be addressed in this article. The focus will be 
an analysis of the theology of Cornelius Van Til, an influential conservative 
Presbyterian theologian who taught at Princeton and Westminster Theo-
logical Seminaries (for 43 years at the latter). His thought emerged particu-
larly from the Dutch Reformed tradition (he was born in the Netherlands) 
and the fideism of Abraham Kuyper (who was Prime Minister of the Neth-
erlands from 1901–1905). What makes his thought so useful for present 
purposes, is that his theology represents, working from strictly orthodox 
Calvinist foundations, a profoundly serious attempt to get to grips with mo-
dernity, and to provide it with a deep apologetic response. As will be seen, in 
the process of this analysis various inferences will emerge which have much 
wider applicability to Evangelical thought.
The perspective I will develop here finds much in common with Van 
Til’s epistemology, but nonetheless rejects his metaphysics; indeed it will be 
argued here that, contrary to what Van Til and his followers maintained, his 
metaphysics and his epistemology are actually ultimately mutually exclu-
sive. Three key areas of agreement with Van Til emerge: (a) the rejection of 
the idea that any discipline of study can be rightly undertaken except from 
an explicitly theological perspective; (b) the belief that all human knowl-
edge is analogical; and (c) the critique of rationalism (the belief that au-
tonomous human discursive reason, apart from any transcendent source of 
truth, can provide an objective description of the world which is conceptu-
ally precise).2 However, it will also be argued here that these valid insights 
in Van Til’s thought are not properly grounded, but rather are undercut, 
by his Calvinist ontology. Van Til surrenders to modern rationalism, and 
undermines a consistent Christian apologetic and worldview, by severing 
ontologically the creation from its Creator. In this article it will be argued 
2 The term “rationalism” is being employed here in a broad sense, not in its narrow sense 
(such as when it is employed to denote a particular school of early modern continental 
philosophy, represented by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz). As used here, “rationalism” 
encompasses the entire spectrum of Western philosophy since Descartes, both before 
and after the Kantian “Copernican revolution”; and hence includes empiricism, which 
is often contrasted with rationalism in the narrow sense. The differences between 
empiricism and rationalism (in the narrow sense) are insignificant from the point of 
view of the present analysis.
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that the only adequate answer to rationalism and its ultimate endpoint, 
nihilism, is a return to the kind of participatory theism advocated by the 
church fathers.
The position defended here arrives at somewhat similar conclusions to 
the contemporary theological movement known as “radical orthodoxy,” al-
though in contrast to radical orthodoxy, the theological stance of this au-
thor is broadly Anabaptist, mystical and Pietist, with influences like Caspar 
Schwenckfeld, Jakob Böhme, and Gottfried Arnold.3
Van Til  on Analo gical Knowled ge
Van Til argued that all human descriptions of God, and indeed, of anything 
in the world at all, must be analogous, and not univocal. What Van Til means 
by “analogy,” however, requires some explanation. According to Van Til all 
human description is analogical in character. We never achieve univocal de-
scription, even of ordinary, mundane things like tables and chairs, let alone 
of spiritual realities.4 By univocal description, Van Til has in mind an exact, 
precise application to reality of a concept in a description, which lies wholly 
within our cognitive grasp, very much along the lines of what Descartes 
called a “clear and distinct idea.”5 According to Van Til, all of our descrip-
tions of the world are to some extent “approximate,” and we can never pin 
down in language precisely in what respect the approximation consists. 
There are “two levels of knowledge,” God’s knowledge, which is perfect, and 
human knowledge, which is “derivative and reinterpretative,” so that “man’s 
knowledge is analogical of God’s knowledge.”6
3 On “radical orthodoxy,” see John Milbank, “Suspending the Material: The Turn of 
Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine 
Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 1–20. Milbank writes, “[t]he 
central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is ‘participation’ as developed by Plato 
and reworked by Christianity, because any alternative configuration perforce reserves a 
territory independent of God. The latter can only lead to nihilism (though in different 
guises). Participation, however, refuses any reserve of created territory, while allowing 
finite things their own integrity … every discipline must be framed by a theological 
perspective; otherwise these disciplines will define a zone apart from God, grounded 
literally in nothing” (3). In addition to radical orthodoxy, the present work also finds some 
common ground with the French Neoplatonic revival. See Wayne J. Hankey, “French 
Neoplatonism in the 20th century,” Animus 4 (1999): 135–67.
4 Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, ed. William Edgar (Phillipsburg: 
P&R Publishing, 2007), 31, 177–78, 183.
5 René Descartes, Discourse on the Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. 
Elizabeth. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, ed. D. Weissman (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996), 25, 100.
6 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 33.
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This accounts for why it is so difficult for Van Til to explain precisely 
what he has in mind, and why he has sometimes been accused of being 
circular.7 If what Van Til says is true, then whatever definition or expla-
nation is given of analogy, must itself be analogical. There is no univocal 
language available to us that we can employ to describe analogy, any more 
than anything else. Van Til’s critics are mistaken, however, to think that this 
represents a valid objection to his theory. The issue here is not circularity, 
but rather, the distinction between object language and metalanguage. In 
discussing analogical description, it becomes our object language. However, 
if Van Til is correct, then the metalanguage which we use to describe this 
object language must also be analogical, since there is no other alternative 
form of language that is available to us. This does not invalidate the metalin-
guistic description.8 Any theoretical account of univocal description must 
itself employ what the theory claims is univocal language in the expression 
of that theory, and nobody believes that this involves a fatal circularity. Nei-
ther, therefore, does it involve Van Til in circularity to claim that analogical 
language must be explicated by means of analogy.
Of course, we still will not have a precise understanding of what 
analogical description means; but that is just the point—we can never have 
that kind of precise understanding of anything. If knowing the meaning 
of a word we are using means having a precise, exact and comprehensive 
conception of what it means, then, according to Van Til, we just never know 
the meaning of anything we say. But such an exact and precise conception, 
or Cartesian “clear and distinct idea,” is not necessary for us—we can func-
tion perfectly adequately with the kind of approximate, fuzzy, inexact an-
alogical knowledge that we possess. There are parallels here between Van 
Til’s perspective and that of the later Wittgenstein: the underlying concep-
tual structure of human language is seen as transcendental; it provides us 
with our ability to possess knowledge, but can never itself be the object of 
 
7 For example, Sproul, Gerstner and Lindsley claim that “presuppositionalist orthodoxy 
makes circularity the hallmark of truth.” R.C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, 
Classical Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 318.
8 Kent Bach writes: “Although for formal purposes the distinction between metalanguage 
and object language must be maintained, in practice one can use a language to talk 
about expressions in the very same language. One can, in Carnap’s terms, shift from the 
material mode to the formal mode, e.g. from ‘Every veterinarian is an animal doctor’ to 
‘“Veterinarian” means “animal doctor.”’” Kent Bach, “Metalanguage,” in The Cambridge 
Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 560–61 (emphasis added in first sentence).
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that knowledge.9 Van Til is right, therefore, when he says, “we may speak of 
our method as being transcendental.”10
Origins of Modern R ationalism
Van Til’s argument that all human knowledge is analogical is based upon 
the biblical doctrines of the incomprehensibility of God, and the finiteness 
of autonomous human reason.11 We could sum his argument up by saying 
this: no-one can have a “God’s-eye view” of the world except God. The idea 
that humans, independently of God, can have an objective view of reality is 
deluded. In fact, it is idolatry, since it makes humans into God, by claiming 
for them a view of reality that belongs to God alone. It is the sin of Adam 
and Eve, who, in seeking to be like God, sought to know good and evil (Gen 
3:5), and to be the judges of what is true and what is false independently 
of God. All human cognition is conditioned, contextualized and distorted 
by alienation from divine revelation. It is subjective and relative, and not 
objective or absolute.
Nonetheless, ever since Descartes a fundamental error of modernity has 
been that humans can attain objective, absolute knowledge independently 
of any transcendent revelation. This idea of an absolute and non-perspecti-
val view of reality (famously dubbed the “view from nowhere”),12 is an inte-
gral component of the mythology of modernity. In this article I will briefly 
discuss three interrelated intellectual foundations for modern rationalism.13 
 
9 Wittgenstein writes: “In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown 
(not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shows that I can adduce only 
exterior facts about language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. 
E. M. Anscombe 3rd ed., (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 42e (remark 120).
10 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 35.
11 Van Til, being a strident Calvinist, also refers a great deal to the “noetic effects of sin” 
(e.g. Systematic Theology, 56). However, since he explicitly admits that humans must 
have reasoned analogously even prior to the fall—“In Paradise man’s knowledge was self-
consciously analogical” (63)— it seems that sin has not materially affected the situation 
vis-à-vis the necessity of all human knowledge being analogical. Van Til comments that 
if “even in paradise” human knowledge was analogical, then “how much the more” must 
fallen human knowledge be analogical (151). However, his descriptions of analogical 
knowledge before and after the fall do not reveal any material difference between these 
two conditions. So it seems that the “noetic effects of sin” play mainly a rhetorical role in 
Van Til’s writings in relation to analogy, to demonstrate his orthodox Calvinist credentials. 
The real issue is human beings’ status as finite creatures, not their sinfulness.
12 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
13 Similar ground has been trodden in the past by many writers, including Étienne Gilson, 
Hans Blumenberg, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Jean-François Courtine. Of particular 
influence on the present author, however, have been the writings of René Guénon.
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Although traces can be found latent in earlier thought (most notably in 
Aristotle),14 these three foundational principles first originated clearly to-
gether in the thought of the medieval philosophers Duns Scotus and Wil-
liam of Ockham. They established the groundwork that made possible the 
emergence of modern philosophy in the writings of René Descartes. The 
three foundation stones of rationalism to be discussed are: (a) the thin con-
ception of Being; (b) nominalism; and (c) the idea of univocal description. 
The combined effect of these influences was to sever the connection be-
tween the created order and its Creator, and ultimately to dispense with the 
Creator altogether. I will then discuss how Van Til himself unwittingly buys 
into the modern error in his ontology, and how his insights concerning ana-
logical knowledge can actually only find coherent grounding in a direction 
which he emphatically rejects: the Platonic doctrine of participation.
The Thin Conception of Being
Traditionally, the being or existence of entities within the created realm was 
regarded as related to and dependent upon the existence of a transcendent 
archē or first principle of reality. Duns Scotus, however, attacked this tradi-
tional view by arguing for the “univocity of being.”15 On this view, the being 
of God is of exactly the same kind as the being of any other entity. William 
of Ockham followed his lead.16
This led to the idea that Being is essentially a “thin” concept, and that 
there is basically nothing to say about it. Thus, for example, in laying the 
groundwork for modern philosophy, Descartes bypasses the question of Be-
ing altogether. As Heidegger notes, what substance is is left unexplained 
by Descartes; substances are characterized only in terms of properties that 
 
14 Jacobi, the great “gadfly” of German Romanticism, quoted Frie as saying: “It was Aristotle 
who first separated the forms of reflection from the remaining material cognition 
completely; he isolated the faculty of reflection in order to experiment with it. And at 
once the error arose of seeking the law of truth only in the clarity of the cognition of the 
understanding.” Quoted in Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, The Main Philosophical Writings 
and the Novel Allwill, trans. George Di Giovanni (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2009), 542 n. 3.
15 J. Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings: A Selection, trans. Allan Wolter (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1987), 4, 20.
16 As Tage Lindborn writes, “Ockham delivered a telling blow against the conception of 
creation as a total unity, a macrocosm, by proclaiming that existence is a multiversum: 
that everything is individual, discrete, atomic, and separate from all else. Even God is not 
exempt from all of this; even he is una res, a thing among other things; and this means 
that God is separated from his creation.” Tage Lindbom, The Myth of Democracy (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 20.
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differentiate them from each other, not in terms of what they have in 
common (existence).17 Descartes leaves Being unexplained because, follow-
ing Ockham, he does not see anything to explain. Being is perhaps the most 
impenetrable of concepts; modernity, which prides itself on a supposed ex-
actitude, cannot cope with incomprehensibility, and so dispenses with the 
mystery by asserting that there is nothing to know. The modern assertion 
of the thin conception of Being was put most bluntly by Kant, in his famous 
dictum that “Being is not a Real predicate.”18
The thin conception of Being, which asserts that the question of Being 
is trivial and that there are just things which exist, without that existence 
involving anything more substantial in terms of their relation to each oth-
er, is the first foundation stone of modernity. It severed the created order 
from God in terms of its existence. Speaking of existence was now possible 
without needing to speak about God.
Nominalism with R espect to the Transcendent
The second foundation stone of modernity is nominalism. This theory, 
which is particularly associated with Ockham, asserts that objects which 
possess the same property, and which are described by the same predi-
cate, have nothing ontologically in common with each other. The proper-
ty name or predicate is merely a label or name for an otherwise disparate 
collection of objects, and does not refer to something real which all the 
objects instantiate.
Not all modern philosophers have followed Ockham in 
adopting a general nominalism. What has become widespread, however, is 
nominalism with respect to the transcendent. That is, moderns generally deny 
that objects in the created realm all participate in a single eternal transcend-
ent “Form of the Good,” God. This view was held virtually unanimously by 
the early church fathers, who formalized the doctrines of the Trinity and the 
hypostatic union, and employed participatory metaphysics everywhere in 
 
 
17 Heidegger writes: “Thus the ontological grounds for defining the ‘world’ as res extensa have 
been made plain: they lie in the idea of substantiality, which not only remains unclarified 
in the meaning of its Being, but gets passed off as something incapable of clarification, 
and gets represented indirectly by way of whatever substantial property belongs most pre-
eminently to the particular substance.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: HarperCollins, 1962), 127 (H 94).
18 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 567.
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doing so.19 The denial of this position by the medieval nominalists resulted 
in a severing of the connection between God and the created order in terms 
of form and property. It was now possible to speak of the form and property 
of created entities without speaking of God.
Descartes was, in fact, a thoroughgoing nominalist, but what is 
important here is that his theory is nominalistic in terms of how it relates the 
natural world (the res extensa) to God. God is conceived by Descartes as a 
res cogitans, and there is no ontological link between extension and thought. 
They are just absolutely distinct attributes, like chalk and cheese. The fun-
damental attribute of the physical world, extension, can be understood per-
fectly well on its own terms without any understanding or characterization 
of the divine. For Descartes, the only link between God (or for that matter 
other minds,20 for God is not the only res cogitans) and the physical realm, 
is by means of causation.21
The same kind of nominalism with respect to the transcendent is clearly 
seen in Kant, when he asserts that the transcendent realm (the noume-
nal world of “things in themselves”), is unknowable, and that form per-
tains purely to the phenomenal world.22 But Kant is more consistent than 
Descartes, because he confines causation to the phenomenal world as well; 
this, however, requires dispensing with God’s capability to interact with the 
world, and a complete rejection of the possibility of the supernatural.
19 As John Rist writes: “There is a widespread belief that Patristic Christianity was deeply 
imbued with Platonism. If that means that the Fathers thought at least in part in the categories 
of Platonism more than in those of other schools, that they often accepted something 
like Plato’s theory of Forms, talked about participation (though often of the created in 
the uncreated as much as of particular Forms) or of the Platonic Form of the Good, the 
belief is largely correct. If it means that they had a conscious theory that Platonism forms a 
halfway house to Christianity, and that it can be fitted in, modified, reformed, and above all 
completed so as to become Christianity, that view … is really due to Augustine.” John Rist, 
“Plotinus and Christian Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd P. 
Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 408.
20 As an aside, this is another characteristic feature of modernity: to regard the spirit and 
the mind/consciousness as being one and the same entity, and to treat these two words 
as synonymous (besides Descartes, classic modern examples of this include Berkeley and 
Hegel, the latter of whom, for example, speaks of a “phenomenology of spirit,” when he 
really means a phenomenology of consciousness).
21 This was ultimately unsatisfactory, since causation between substances must have some 
ontological grounding. The attempt to resolve this problem in Cartesian thought led first 
to the occasionalism of Malebranche, and from there it was a small step via the Eleatic 
Principle to the pantheism of Spinoza. Another attempt to evade the problem was the 
denial of causal interaction between substances found in Leibniz.
22 Kant’s idealism was an idealism regarding form. See Paul Redding, Continental Idealism: 
Leibniz to Nietzsche (New York: Routledge, 2009), 2.
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Univo cal Description
Van Til correctly notes that at the core of rationalism is the idea of 
univocal description; but he fails to recognise a crucial corollary that must 
follow from this insight, that therefore rationalism must be essentially a 
modern phenomenon.23 When Thomas Aquinas asserted that “no words ap-
ply literally to God,”24 he was not proposing a novel doctrine, but merely re-
stating the consensus of Christian theology since the earliest days of Chris-
tianity (and also the position of Plato25 and Neoplatonism26). The claim that 
all descriptions, including those of God, must be univocal, was put forward 
by Scotus.27 It then manifested itself again in the Cartesian claim to be able 
to form “clear and distinct ideas.”
In addition to the historical fact that the idea of generalised univocal de-
scription originates around the turn of the fourteenth century, the fact that ra-
tionalism is a modern phenomenon can also be clearly demonstrated from the 
fact that the idea of univocal description is inextricably bound up with both 
of the preceding foundations of modernity (the thin conception of Being, and 
nominalism). Since God is incomprehensible, then any created entity which 
participates in God must thereby incorporate a degree of incomprehensibility 
also. Thus the ontological bonding between ordinary created things and God 
must be severed, if univocal conceptualization is to be possible.
23 Van Til regards rationalism as characterizing the entire history of Western philosophy 
since Plato, and sees no special significance in modernity. See for example, Val Til, 
Systematic Theology, 76–78, 202. He writes “the distinction between the ‘ancient’ mind 
and the ‘modern’ mind is not fundamental” (202).
24 Thomas Aquinas, “One Way of Understanding God-Talk,” in Philosophy of Religion: A 
Guide and Anthology, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 159.
25 For example, “so far as it lies in words to be incontrovertible and immovable, they 
must in no wise fall short of this … . If then … we should not prove able to render an 
account everywhere and in all respects consistent and accurate, let no one be surprised.” 
Plato, Timaeus, trans. and ed. R. D. Archer-Hind (London: Macmillan, 1888), 89–91, 
emphasis added. Another example: “All that is said by any of us can only be imitation 
and representation … . Wherefore if at the moment of speaking I cannot suitably express 
my meaning, you must excuse me … .” Plato, “Critias,” in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. 
Benjamin Jowett 4th ed., vol. 3, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 789–90.
26 Examples abound: “Our enquiry forces us to use terms not strictly applicable”; “Once 
more, we must be patient with language; we are forced for reasons of exposition to apply 
to the Supreme terms which strictly are ruled out; everywhere we must read ‘So to speak.’”; 
“Observe that such words as ‘always, never, sometimes’ [in relation to Eternity] must 
be taken as mere conveniences of exposition”; and “the word weakness … is applied to 
the Soul merely by analogy (analogia)”. Plotinus, The Enneads, abridged, trans. Stephen 
MacKenna, ed. John Dillon (London: Penguin, 1991), 525, 526, 219, 68.
27 Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, 82–95.
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A Critique of Van Til
The fundamental problem in Van Til’s thought is that he confuses two quite 
different accounts of the analogical relation, treating them as if they were 
the same, when they are not. The mistake arises from his application of the 
ectype/archetype distinction both metaphysically and epistemologically. Van 
Til erroneously believes that these two applications are equivalent. In the 
earlier section of this article, “Van Til on Analogical Knowledge,” what was 
actually being described was just his epistemological account of analogy, 
an account which is essentially correct. It is now necessary to describe, and 
critique, his metaphysical account of analogy, and then explain why it is 
incompatible with the epistemological account.
Van Til’s metaphysical account of analogy is grounded in his nominal-
ism with respect to the transcendent. Van Til is an exponent of nominalist 
theism, because he regards the created realm as entirely ontologically dis-
tinct from God.28 Thus, when we use a predicate of God (say “is good”), we 
refer to a property which ontologically is entirely distinct from when we 
use the same predicate in ordinary cases (“Bob Smith is good”). But this 
raises an obvious problem: what, then, justifies our using the same word 
in both cases? Van Til’s doctrine of the archetypal/ectypal relation is in-
tended to overcome this problem; but it actually represents just a rework-
ing of the classical nominalist strategy of invoking resemblance as a primi-
tive (as in Locke).29 Van Til has introduced a special type of resemblance 
that is vertically oriented between the creature and the Creator. Van Til’s 
archetype/ectype relation, is, like Lockean resemblance, mysteriously 
primitive; but fatally so, since in the case of Van Til, we can never have 
epistemological access to one side of the resemblance relation (the arche-
type, God), a problem that does not arise for Locke. This is a fundamental 
weakness in Van Til’s metaphysics; we are supposed to understand God as 
being revealed in creation by means of the ectype, but we know that the 
ectype is ontologically absolutely distinct from the archetype, and we also 
cannot have any epistemological access to the archetype to facilitate our 
 
 
 
 
28 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 72. See also John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of 
his Thought (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1995), 53.
29 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, abridged, ed. Andrew S. Pringle-
Pattison (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 231–32.
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understanding of the nature of the resemblance in question. Despite Van 
Til’s best intentions, this entails that God would be unknowable.30
According to this metaphysical account of analogy, the analogical 
relation is fundamentally a vertical metaphysical one, between a lower tier 
of reality (the creation, the ectype) and an upper tier of reality (the Crea-
tor, the archetype). Hence analogy is a reality/reality relation. However, if 
the analogical relation is between created ectype and divine archetype, then 
it follows necessarily that only the archetype, God, would need to be de-
scribed analogically. The ectype should be able to be described univocally. 
But Van Til resists this conclusion: he argues that all human description 
must be analogical, whether of the creature or the Creator.
The reason for this is that Van Til also applies the ectype/archetype 
relation epistemologically, arguing that human concepts and knowledge as 
a whole are only analogical to God’s knowledge. Thus human knowledge is 
the ectype, and divine knowledge the archetype. However, since God knows 
reality perfectly and exhaustively, this means that reality as a whole is the 
archetype also. From this it follows that any description of anything at all, 
even in the created realm, must be analogical. But Van Til fails to realize 
that this application of the ectype/archetype distinction to knowledge, rather 
than to metaphysical reality, generates a different theory of analogy. Because 
the epistemological ectype/archetype distinction holds the ectype to be 
human knowledge, and the archetype to be reality as it truly is, the theory 
emerges as fundamentally a concept/reality theory of analogy. It holds that 
human concepts apply only analogously to reality (and that includes both 
created reality and the Creator). The fundamental incoherence in Van Til’s 
thinking is that he confounds a metaphysical, reality/reality doctrine of the 
analogical relation, with an epistemological, concept/reality doctrine, and 
he fails to realize that the two are not the same.
Furthermore, Van Til’s epistemological ectype/archetype, or concept/ 
reality doctrine of analogy, is essentially the theory of the Platonic tradition. 
30 Van Til’s complete denial that any knowledge of God is possible apart from scriptural 
revelation makes the problem still more acute (Systematic Theology, 314–18). Like 
Barth (but in an even more expansive sense) Van Til emphatically says “Nein!” to the 
possibility of natural theology. The problem which flows from this, which Van Til does 
not acknowledge, is that scripture is written in ordinary human languages, languages 
which are shared by believer and unbeliever alike. Human language must therefore be 
conceptually adequate to serve as a vehicle for divine revelation. It is hard to see how this 
could be true given Van Til’s position, which cannot provide any satisfactory account of 
how this unique vertical concept of analogy/resemblance could either be already present 
in ordinary human language, or be constructed out of it.
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As speech is the echo of the thought in the Soul, so thought in the 
Soul is an echo from elsewhere: that is to say, as the uttered thought 
is an image of the soul-thought, so the soul-thought images a thought 
above itself and is the interpreter of a higher sphere.31
What Plotinus is saying here is that human thought and discursive 
reasoning are only, to use Van Til’s phrase, “derivative and reinterpretative”32 
echoes or images of ultimate reality, and that human knowledge (or at 
least, discursive knowledge) is therefore only analogous. Plotinus, like Van 
Til, has a concept/reality theory of analogy. Van Til’s epistemological appli-
cation of the ectype/archetype distinction has just brought him full circle 
back to the traditional ancient doctrine of analogy.
If Van Til is expressing two different theories of analogy, then are they 
perhaps complementary and compatible with each other? No, they are in 
fact mutually exclusive, because the only adequate underlying metaphysical 
groundings for the two theories are contradictory. A concept/reality theory 
of analogy, which holds that all human description is analogical, cannot be 
rightly grounded in an ontology like Van Til’s. This is because he completely 
severs the created realm from the Creator ontologically; yet it is precisely 
this severance which must express itself as rationalism, since it implies that 
created entities in their essential nature can be understood on their own 
terms, without reference to their Creator. This provides the foundation 
for a naturalistic science. It also entails that the Creator is unknowable, as 
discussed above. Instead of an analogical knowledge with respect to both 
creation and Creator, Van Til’s ontology, by implication, leaves us with uni-
vocity with regard to the former and equivocity for the latter. The proper 
ontological grounding for a concept/reality theory of analogy is the Platonic 
doctrine of participation. Because every created entity participates in God, 
it is fundamentally related to God in its essence, and therefore must incor-
porate something of the divine incomprehensibility. Thus no created entity 
can be precisely conceptualized by humans. Furthermore, because language 
itself participates in the forms, there is no “divorce between words and 
things.”33 Only this view provides an adequate account of how analogical 
description is ontologically grounded in human finiteness.
31 Plotinus, Enneads, 19.
32 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 33.
33 The quotation is from Michel de Certeau, cited in John Montag, “Revelation: The False 
Legacy of Suárez,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine 
Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 50.
269Albert R. Haig, Modernity, “Radical Orthodoxy,” and Cornelius 
Van Til: A Journey of Rediscovery of Participatory Theism
Nihilism as the Inevitable O u tcome of R ationalism
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi was a vehement critic of Kant and German 
Idealism. He was also one of the most prophetic thinkers of modern times. 
He saw clearly where rationalism would end, and he introduced the term ni-
hilism to describe it.34 Ultimately, argued Jacobi, autonomous human reason 
acting alone could establish nothing except for “knowledge of the nothing”; 
vacuous “logical phantoms,” empty of meaning, such as “A=A.” His work 
caused a sensation in Germany, where he was accused of being an irration-
alist, a charge which he denied. A century later, however, Jacobi’s prediction 
was confirmed by Nietzsche, who gloated that: “I will describe what hap-
pens next, what must necessarily happen: the triumph of Nihilism.”35 Why 
must rationalism lead to nihilism?
An account derived from the later Wittgenstein might go as follows: in 
thinking, we employ language, a language which is a public phenomenon 
and which we learned as infants.36 From ordinary language terms we ab-
stract technical terms. The problem is, that we can never grasp or hold be-
fore our eyes the full precise Husserlian “horizon” or meaning of the terms 
we employ. We have instinctively learned, by being corrected by others, 
how to use ordinary language terms appropriately in most cases without 
having to think consciously about their application at all. If forced to think 
consciously of the meaning of a term, we can bring to mind various 
stereotypical instances and so forth, which are helpful cues for our usage, 
and perhaps give a “rough and ready” idea of the meaning, but we cannot 
hold in mind the complete and exact meaning of any concept. Indeed, to 
do so would require bringing our entire language before our view, because 
“[t]he sign (the sentence) gets its signification from the system of signs, 
from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sen-
tence means understanding a language.”37 Furthermore, bringing the entire 
language into view in this way would be impossible anyway, as it would 
34 Jacobi, Philosophical Writings, 519, 583.
35 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All 
Values, vol. 1, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
vol. 14, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), 1.
36 Other accounts are possible starting from different philosophical perspectives. For 
an account of how Heidegger’s phenomenology approached nihilism, see Laurence P. 
Hemming, “Nihilism: Heidegger and the Grounds of Redemption,” in Radical Orthodoxy: 
A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 91–108.
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 
1960), 5.
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require some medium of thought other than language to be so analysed. As 
noted earlier, the conceptual structure of language is transcendental.
When it comes to the meaning of ordinary language terms, and how 
they should be employed, we have a solid standard which enables us to de-
termine whether we are correct or not in how we use them: namely, other 
people. If we are in doubt about a particular English expression, we may 
find another competent English speaker, and ask them. However, with ab-
stract, technical terms, we have no such recourse. It is argued, in different 
ways, by both Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein, that abstract, technical 
terms are conceptually dependent upon ordinary language terms, which are 
taken and “refined” or allegedly “made precise” by making various modifi-
cations to their usage. Thus Wittgenstein comments: “When philosophers 
use a word and enquire about its meaning we must always ask: is this word 
actually used thus in the language which created it?”38 The question is, then, 
what gives these technical, abstract terms, their conceptual stability?
Modernists like Descartes would reply that they are conceptually stable 
because we have a “clear and distinct idea” of what they mean. However, this 
has been called into question by much modern philosophy, from Heidegger 
to the later Wittgenstein to Derrida, and with good reason. A detailed ar-
gument along these lines lies outside the scope of the present work, but 
an important piece of evidence is the inability of different philosophers to 
reach any significant degree of agreement with each other in terms of their 
conclusions, despite high intelligence, knowledge and application. This sug-
gests that the project of philosophy is somehow inherently misconceived; 
and the explanation offered here is that the misconception arises because 
the abstract terms employed in philosophy just cannot be conceptually 
stable, because they have nothing to stabilize them. A philosopher might 
think that she has a clear and distinct idea of something, but in reality the 
concept concerned is vague and largely undefined and has been made pre-
cise only at certain arbitrary points, which govern how the system of phi-
losophy subsequently develops. A system of philosophy, therefore, always 
represents the subjective whims and character of the philosopher. This must 
ultimately lead, at a cultural level, to a nihilistic conclusion.
This brings us to the use of abstract concepts in theology. A couple of 
comments are in order. Firstly, theological concepts can only have any sta-
bility (other than as Wittgensteinian “nonsense” within a form of life) if 
they are grounded in the transcendent in some manner. Secondly, it is likely 
38 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader, ed. Anthony Kenny, 2nd ed., (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2006), 59.
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a mistake to take theological systems too seriously. This comment is not 
intended to denigrate the value of theology, nor should it be construed as 
anti-metaphysical in any way, but only serves to warn against theological 
dogmatism.39 Because all theological constructs are “approximations,” it 
may be that two apparently mutually contradictory systems of theology are 
actually both perfectly legitimate as analogies. If someone says “x=9,” and 
also “x=10,” then, if we interpret these statements strictly literally, there is 
a contradiction. But if we treat these statements both as approximations, 
then they both may be perfectly valid, dependent on context. Suppose that, 
in reality, x=9.63724. An approximation that rounds down to the integer 
below (in this case 9), is demanded by convention in some contexts (for 
example, in answering the question, “how old are you?”), whereas in other 
contexts rounding to the nearest integer (in this case 10), is appropriate. So 
either answer above could be perfectly valid if the statements are treated as 
approximations. Thus, it may be that apparently contradictory theological 
systems are both perfectly valid and valuable as analogies. Each might cap-
ture something that the other does not. This does not require us, either, to 
accept that all theologies are equally valid: someone who said, for example, 
that x=56 would clearly just be wrong.
One final note of caution. The statements set out above describing this 
theory of analogy (such as the numerical approximation example), should 
themselves all be taken as analogical also. They represent an attempt to 
explain analogously why univocal reasoning is impossible. For example, the 
phrase “the conceptual structure of language” should be taken analogously, 
as an “approximation” to something which ultimately cannot be 
conceptualized, and not as a precise rationalistic concept. This is par-
ticularly important in relation to the question of semantic holism,40 since 
the above outline might suggest that I am an adherent of that doctrine. 
I do maintain that semantic holism is true on an analogical basis, that it 
is a much better approximation to the underlying incomprehensible re-
ality than any of the alternatives. However, if semantic holism is taken 
univocally, as a precise rationalistic doctrine, then I reject it; and indeed, 
it could not be formulated univocally without rejecting the central argu-
ment of this article. I deny that we can ever have a precise theoretical 
 
39 This argument in turn might be developed in the direction of Pietism.
40 Ernest LePore defines semantic holism as the view that “the meaning of a symbol is relative 
to the entire system of representations containing it.” Ernest LePore, “Semantic Holism,” 
in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi  2nd ed., (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 829.
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conception of what terms like “meaning” and “concept” mean that 
accurately describes the underlying reality.41
Conclusion:  The Origin of the Tru th in Pl ato
We turn full circle now, to address a final possible objection to the theory 
outlined here. I have argued that much modern Protestant Evangelical the-
ology, represented here by Van Til, is in fact unwittingly heavily influenced 
by modernist philosophical assumptions, and so is far from a purely biblical 
version of Christianity. It is a syncretistic combination of traditional Chris-
tian belief and the modern worldview, a combination which is inherently 
unstable since the assumptions of modernity ultimately lead inexorably 
to nihilism. With radical orthodoxy, I have advocated a return to ground-
ing Christian theology in Platonism, and more specifically in the tradition 
which Hanegraaff calls “Platonic Orientalism,” represented in most devel-
oped form by Neoplatonism. But this brings us back to the opening “Hel-
lenization of Christianity” objection. How could a pagan philosopher have 
arrived at valid truth about God and creation, especially if what has been 
said about philosophy is true?
I see no answer to this question other than the obvious one; namely, 
an explicit revival of the Renaissance tradition of a prisca theologia, or 
“perennial philosophy,” which was in fact precisely the justification used in 
the Renaissance for appropriating Platonist frameworks for theologizing.42 
Unfortunately, the idea of a prisca theologia came into massive discredit 
after the Renaissance because the claimed historical basis for it fell apart 
completely under the withering interrogation of the modern historical- 
critical method.43 The whole fabric of the prisca theologia narrative was left  
 
 
41 It is also worth noting that it is easiest to make sense of Van Til’s thesis that anyone who 
claims to know anything on the basis of autonomous reason, is in effect claiming to know 
everything (a thesis that has puzzled his critics—see Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, 
Classical Apologetics, 239), if one interprets it as an expression of an underlying semantic 
holism on his part.
42 Of course the idea of a prisca theologia expressed in Platonism goes back to the church 
fathers. See, for example, book VIII, chapter 11, of Augustine’s De Civitate Dei (entitled in 
English, as translated by Marcus Dods, “How Plato has been able to approach so nearly to 
Christian knowledge”). 
43 Thus, it was discovered that Dionysius the Areopagite did not write the work attributed 
to him; the Corpus Hermeticum dates from the early Christian era, not centuries earlier; 
Plato could not possibly have read Moses (as was commonly claimed); most of the writings 
which Renaissance Platonists attributed to Zoroaster actually had nothing to do with him 
and were much later texts, and so forth. See Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy.
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in tattered shreds, and appeared to be a mere fantasy, in time becoming 
synonymous with superstition and ignorance.
Obviously, there is no use trying to resurrect the specific prisca theologia 
that was popular in the Renaissance; that indeed would be flogging a dead 
horse. But perhaps, though the specific historical narrative was fanciful, the 
basic idea was sound, and a more historically informed reformulation of 
the narrative is possible. There are some shreds of light that have emerged 
in modern scholarship that suggest that such a project might not be with-
out support. For example, the similarities between early Indian thought 
and Neoplatonism are so significant that, since no convincing evidence of 
any intellectual interaction that could explain the similarities exists, schol-
ars have struggled to find an explanation.44 It has been argued that broadly 
similar ideas are also present in early Chinese thought.45 The universality 
of this doctrine might also be illustrated by appealing to the fact that it is 
mirrored in the subject-predicate structure of all human language. It is also, 
arguably, seen throughout the Bible, such as in Gen 1 when God creates by 
speaking the Word (the forming principle) that shapes an earth which is 
tōhû wābōhû, “without form and void.” A New Testament example might be 
that various scholars, from Albert Schweitzer through to E. P. Sanders, have 
found at the centre of Paul’s theology a concept of “mystical participation.”46 
A rebirth of the prisca theologia narrative, then, might be worth consider-
ing not just on its own terms, but also because it would serve as a rationale 
for Christian theologians to draw on the insights of Platonism, and other 
ancient religious traditions.
44 Albert M. Wolters, “A Survey of Modern Scholarly Opinion on Plotinus and Indian 
Thought,” in Neoplatonism and Indian Thought, ed. R. Baine Harris (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1982), 293–308.
45 René Guénon, The Great Triad, ed. Samuel D. Fohr, 2nd ed., trans. Henry D. Fohr, 
(Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2001), 16–17, 21. 
46 E. P. Sanders. Paul and Palestinian Judaism (London: SCM Press, 1977), 434–74.
